Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 49, Number 1 (Summer 2011)

Article 5

Book Review: Constitutional Theocracy, by Ran
Hirschl
Haider Ala Hamoudi

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Book Review

Citation Information
Hamoudi, Haider Ala. "Book Review: Constitutional Theocracy, by Ran Hirschl." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 49.1 (2011) : 151-157.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol49/iss1/5

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

151

Book Review
CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY, by Ran Hirschl 1
2
HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI
WHEN I WAS A CHILD, the chant I always associated with Islamism, one still in
use among the Taliban,3 was "the Qur'an is our constitution." Gradually it has
been replaced, however, with the mantra of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,
"Islam is the solution."' These simplistic tropes seem similar, but the difference
between them is significant. In many ways, this distinction lies at the heart of the
considerable contribution that Ran Hirschl has made in his fine work, Constitutional Theocracy, to the understanding of constitutional governance in societies
where there is a substantial legal and formal recognition of religion. However,
this distinction also reveals the biggest problem in his analysis. Simply stated, one
of these slogans ("the Qur'an is our constitution") is logically incompatible not
only with modern constitutional governance but also with the very notion of the
Westphalian nation-state, while the other ("Islam is the solution") is not.
To many people raised in a secular tradition, constitutional governance is
necessarily secular. It is precisely this belief, often so thoroughly internalized that
it is not questioned, that Hirschl convincingly critiques. Developing ideas that he
introduced in much of his earlier work, Hirschl compellingly argues that a new
form of government, known as constitutional theocracy, has arrived on the global
scene. He then defines some of its more salient features.' Aptly criticizing comparative constitutional scholars who are focused exclusively on Western societies'
1.
2.

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010) 300 pages.
Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.

3.

I owe this piece of information to my friend Dr. Wadir Safi, a former Dean of the Law and
Political Science Faculty at Kabul University. Placards with this phrasing were found in Tahrir
Square during the recent demonstrations against the former Mubarak regime, though their
use appeared from television broadcasts to be limited to more hardline Salafi groups.
Anthony Shadid, "Yearning for Respect, Arabs Find a Voice," New York Times (30 January
2011) A10.
Supra note 1 at 2-3.

4.
5.
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separation of religion and state,6 Hirschl points out that a healthy proportion
of the world's population lives in constitutionalist systems that include one or
another of the features of constitutional theocracy.' While he acknowledges that
the marriage of theocratic and constitutional governance is one fraught with
friction, Hirschl also points out-correctly-that the two systems have far more
in common than has been previously acknowledged.8
While I might quibble with one or two details, this central claim is a compelling part of Hirschl's work and is convincingly delivered with ample examples
of constitutional text and praxis to support it. Less convincing is what I might
describe as an ancillary thesis, though one Hirschl takes quite seriously, which is
that constitutional theocratic structure is a rational and prudent secular response
to growing global religious fervour. Hirschl argues that constitutional theocracy is
designed to empower courts, with their secularly trained elite judges, to interpret
religious mandate, thereby constraining, limiting, and in some cases neutering
the more radical religious claims.' I do not mean that Hirschl is entirely wrong
about this, for surely he is describing a fair number of constitutional theocratic
states accurately. However, when understood as a global feature of constitutional
theocracy, his description seems flawed in at least two respects. First, the notion of
court as secularizing agent may be widely applicable but, as Hirschl well knows,
it is by no means universal. There are plainly courts and legal systems in which
the judiciary is far from being a force on the side of secular and progressive
liberalism. Second, and more importantly, Hirschl seems to be conflating two
different phenomena. The first involves traditional and informal forces of lawmaking and law interpretation, from tribal councils to local priests (i.e., those
likely to proclaim Qur'an as constitution), that any state instrument, including
a court, would seek to constrain and limit for reasons that Max Weber described
decades ago."8 The second involves religio-political movements operating within
the state and competing for maximum control over state institutions and apparatus. To assume that these immensely popular movements, which are perfectly
comfortable within a national constitutional structure (but still hold Islam as the
solution), will not be able to exercise significant influence over a judiciary seems
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Ibid at 243-44.
Ibidat 3.
Ibid at 206-07.
Ibid at 13.
Weber's work has proven deeply influential in the social sciences. In Politics as a Vocation,
he argued that.states are defined by their legitimate monopolization of violence in society.
See e.g. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, translated by HH Gerth & C Wright Mills
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965) at 1-3.
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fanciful and difficult to defend, at least as an empirical matter. It seems that
Hirschl therefore describes not so much the successful constraining of religion
by forces of secularism as the destruction of the traditional mechanisms for the
creation of religious law. These traditional mechanisms were replaced with something altogether different-whether the new mechanisms are secular or simply
some dramatic mutation o f religio-legal norms that enable them to fit better
within a modern state paradigm. Precisely why religious movements would go
along as happily with such destruction as they have is a matter deserving of some
consideration.
The balance of this review proceeds in two Parts. Part I describes Hirschl's
central thesis and explains why it is a fresh and compelling contribution. Part II
describes the ancillary claim that the courts in constitutional theocracies operate as secular agents and highlights some of the problems associated therewith,
as outlined above.

I. THE NATURE OF THEOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
Along with Larry Cati Backer in the United States," Hirschl deserves immense
credit -for giving serious and sustained thought to this rising constitutional
phenomenon he defines as "theocratic constitutionalism." While most of the
popular media was, and often continues to be, enthralled with the notion that
one cannot marry the idea that the People are sovereign with the idea that God
is sovereign,12 Backer, Hirschl, and others (among them Noah Feldman 3 ) have
been at the forefront of those proclaiming that this combination is precisely what
various political movements have sought to do. Such scholars offer convincing
explanations for why these oft-adopted modalities of governance deserve greater
attention than they have been receiving.
Hirschl describes four main components to theocratic constitutionalism,
the first of which, prosaically enough, is constitutionalism. This characteristic
presumably excludes the Taliban, who combine religious and political authority
entirely and who do not divide political authority into constituent units, let alone
empower a judiciary to engage in anything resembling judicial review."4 However,
11.

"Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global Legal Ordering" (2009) 16
Ind J Global Legal Stud 85.
12. Hirschl himself points out this phenomenon. Supra note 1 at 206.
13. See e.g. AfterJihad.America and the Strugglefor Islamic Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux; 2003) at 6-7.
14. See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban:Militant Islam, Oil andFundamentalismin CentralAsia, 2d ed
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) at 93-94 (describing Taliban contempt for any
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the requirement of constitutionalism would be fulfilled in systems such as Iran,
which governs itself by a constitution and which recognizes at least a formal
distinction between the clerical institutions of Qom and the political institutions
15
ofTeheran.
The balance of the features of theocratic constitutionalism-the privileging
of a single religion, the constitutional enshrining of that religion as source of and
constraint upon legislation, and the existence, of non-state religious bodies-are
straightforward enough. They require little comment other than to say that they
might be criticized in some contexts as excessively formal. To say that a law may
not contravene the "settled rulings of Islam," as article 2 of Iraq's Constitution
does, 6 is not to say very much. As for the requirement that "Islam" be a "source"
(or "a chief source,"' 7 or "the chief source," 8 or "a foundational source,"' 9 as the
case may be) of legislation, it is hard not to dismiss such'a provision as symbolic
and ornamental for the most part. In my experience working with legislatures,
which is extensive in one Arab and Muslim country with such a requirement,
legislative committees do not spend very much time considering "Islam" when
drafting their competition law, consumer protection law, or antidumping law.2"
In some instances, one wonders whether this phenomenon is less theocratic
constitutionalism and more some form of Islam as ornament, relevant only when
the legislature chooses to make it so. For example, in a nation such as Iraq, among
hundreds of opinions, the Federal Supreme Court has decided only a single case
with respect to article 2 (on a matter concerning the requirement that a contract
be in writing).2 Furthermore, most legislation emerging from the post-Saddam
legislature (called the Council of Representatives) bears no reasonable relationship

15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

21.

form of modern state organization along Western lines).
Supra note I at 36-37.
DustfirJumhfriyyat al-'Iraq(Iraqi Constitution), 2005, art 2 [translated by author].
This was the original phrasing in the Egyptian Constitution. DusturJumhfriyyatMisr alArabiyya (Constitution of the Arabic Republic of Egypt), 1971, art 2 [translated in Clark
Lombardi, State Law as IslamicLaw in Modern Egypt: 7he Incorporationofthe Shari'a into
Egyptian ConstitutionalLaw (Leiden: Brill, 2006) at 125].
DustfirJumhariyyatMisral-'Arabiyya(Constitution of the Arabic Republic of Egypt), 2011,
art 2 [translated by author].
Iraqi Constitution, supra note 16.
From 2008 through early 2010, I was based in Baghdad, acting as Deputy Chief of Party to a
project entitled Global Justice Project: Iraq. I was specifically tasked to offer expert advice on
major legislative and constitutional initiatives originating in Iraq's Council of Representatives.
The consultation was part of a larger project organized and run by the.SJ Quinney School
of Law at the University of Utah and funded by the US Embassy's Constitutional and
Legislative Affairs Office.
Decision 60, [2010] Federal Supreme Court of Iraq, online: <http://www.iraqja.iq>.
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to Islam's "rulings," settled or otherwise. It is for this reason that I have tended to
regard the work on theocratic constitutionalism with some hostility in the past,22
though upon reflection I think the fairer criticism would be that, because the
scholarship on this subject paints with such a broad brush, there may be some
messiness in the details in particular nation-states.

II. THE COURT AS SECULARIZING AGENT
Larger problems emerge with the claim that courts are vested with the authority to ensure compliance of legislation with religious law precisely because they
are more likely to constrain and limit the impact of that religious law. Hirschl
is not wrong about this phenomenon in many instances. There can be no
doubt that various secular political hegemonic movements, from Malaysia to
Israel to Egypt, when faced with rising religious fervour, have sought to temper
the movements by investing their courts, staffed as they are by a secular elite,
with the power to invalidate legislation that is deemed to be in conflict with
religious norms.23
Yet exceptions are rife. Chile's Supreme Court, by Hirschl's own admission,
prohibited another branch of the government from distributing the "morningafter" pill freely.24 Since the Islamic revolution, Iran's judiciary and its Guardian
Council (which is empowered to strike down legislation as being un-Islamic)
has acted as a bulwark of religious conservatives against what has at times been
a comparatively progressive parliament and president.25 Perhaps Pakistan affords
the most salient example of this phenomenon. While Hirschl is correct that
much of the Pakistani bar and bench are among the secular elite, it was precisely
this fact that inspired the Pakistani general Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq to create a
separate shari'a court in the first place. That is to say, Zia's decision to Islamize
society and to empower a judiciary with the enforcement of Islamic law was
certainly not meant as a way to limit the influence of shari'a, but rather to
ensure its deeper penetration. When the court failed to do so, Zia replaced it with
a more compliant court, which promptly did.26
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Haider Ala Hamoudi, "Dream Palaces of Law: Western Constructions of the Muslim Legal
World" (2009) 32 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 803 at 807.
See supra note 1 at 86-90.
Ibidat 185.
Nazila Fathi, "Iran's president trying to limit power of clergy," New York Times (29 August
2002) Al.
Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory andPracticefrom the Sixteenth
to the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 159.
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Hirschl also points to former-President Pervez Musharraf's appointment of
a relative moderate, Ejaz Yousaf, as Chief Judge of the Federal Shari'at Court
in Pakistan as an example of a religious court functioning as a check on growing
religious fervour."7 However, this appointment was made at a time when the political authorities were interested in constraining the reach of shari'a, long after the
Islamization plan had been implemented.28 A far more pertinent example of how
the court was supposed to work in ensuring and implementing Islamization occurred at a time when General Zia was in power and responsible for determining
the composition of the shari'abench. Most prominent among his appointments
was M. Taqi Usmani, a leading expert in Islamic finance. Where Yousaf was a
member of Pakistan's chess and cricket teams, Usmani is the son of a mufti. He
has an LL.B., but his primary training is in sbari'a and took place in religious
schools. Where Yousaf may have been known for cricket and chess, Usmani's
curriculum vitae consists of membership in religious associations that are Islamist
to their core.29 He was the author of an opinion of the Shari'at Appellate Bench
that rendered it illegal in Pakistan to charge interest on loans-a decision that
was much celebrated among Islamists, and one that has been disregarded by the
other branches of government." His appointment was by no means a way of
constraining Islam; rather, the appointment made Islam a source of significant
constraint on law-albeit at times, as in the case of the interest ban, an unsuccessful
constraint. Usmani thus has no problem using the state to impose Islam (and
may well be derogating from the right of the traditional cleric to determine what
shari'ais), but he is no secular agent.
Hirschl thus appears to conflate two very different phenomena. One is the
projection of shari'a through state institutions to the derogation of the authorities
who traditionally form Islamic law. The other is the marginalization of shari'ain all
instances. The former is universal, or at least nearly so, while the latter is not. The extent of Hirschl's conflation is evident in his rather lengthy exposition of South Africa
and Canada as providing space for religious and indigenous law, but constraining
and limiting such law to the extent that it seeks to replace the state's secular law.3'
That states seek a monopoly on the exercise and enforcement of law is not a
terribly novel assertion. What is interesting, however, is that unlike South Africa
27.
28.
29.

Supra note 1 at 93-94.
Peters, supra note 26 at 158.
Usmani has his own website profiling these associations in ample detail. See Mufti
Muhammad Usmani, online: <http://www.muftitaqiusmani.com>.
30. Haider Ala Hamoudi, "The Muezzin's Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the Necessity of
Realism in the Study of Islamic Law" (2008) 56 Am J Comp L 423 at 456-58.
31. Supra note 1 at 185-202.
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and Canada, some states do not seek to impose a supreme form of secularized
law. Rather, states like Iran and Pakistan prefer to create a highly selective amalgam
of religious and state law where family law is developed in a manner that defers to
religious law-albeit administered and modified as the state sees fit-and com2
mercial law all but ignores Islamic juristic text in favor of European transplant.?
That is, even when the Islamists have the upper hand, or win through outright
revolution as they did in Iran and Pakistan, they do not change the basic structure
of the theocratic constitutional state to defer to more traditional articulation of
religious law. This may signal the death of Islamic law as understood and articulated by traditional religious scholars, but it does not mean that the state will in
all instances be secularized. In many cases, in fact, it is very much the opposite.
. Thus, I accept the claim that theocratic constitutionalism involves competition
between religious and state law and that the various institutions of government
will be involved on one side or another in that competition. However, I do not
accept that this polarization means that courts, or indeed any political institutions,
necessarily constrain more "radical" religious tendencies-at least not among
those Islamist organizations that have significant backing and that advocate a
modern state. The Usmanis of the theocratic constitutional nation-state are no
less committed to that state than the secularists. The question dividing them is
not whether to permit state supremacy over and state determination of the relevant
content of shari'a-thatmatter has been conclusively setded. The question, rather,
is how much to limit shari'a, and the ensuing competition over state apparatus
therefore revolves around this crucial axis. What this effectively means is that
Islamic law, as determined by traditional non-state jurists and village clerics alike,
is dead and gone. By contrast, theocratic constitutionalism-or the marrying of
modern constitutional structures and secular law with religious law-is here to
stay, irrespective of who controls the state or its judiciary. We are fortunate to
have sharp minds like that of Hirschl dedicated to explaining it.

32.

See Haide Ala Hamoudi, "The Death of Islamic Law" (2010) 38 GaJ Int'l & Comp L 293
at 297.

